Leviathan, Part One Of Man, Ch 6- Ch 10. (E 2)

Leviathan

Part One Of Man, Ch 6- Ch 10.

Part 1. Of Man

        Chap 6. Of the Interior Beginnings of Voluntary Motions; commonly called the Passions. An the Speeches by which they are expressed.

 

·    Motion : Vital and Anmial.

 

Vitall Motions : Motions there needs no help of Imagination

Animal Motions (Voluntary Motions) : Motion in such manner as is first fancied in our minds

That Sense, is Motion in the organs and interiour parts of mans body, caused by the action of the things we See, Heare, &c.; And that Fancy is but the Reliques of the same Motion, remaining after Sense.

oluntary motions, depend alwayes upon a precedent thought of Whither, Which Way, and What; it is evident, that the Imagination is the first internall beginning of all Voluntary Motion.

·    Endeavor

These small beginnings of Motion, within the body of Man, before they appear in walking, speaking, striking, and other visible actions, are commonly called ENDEAVOUR.

·    Appetite and Desire

This Endeavour, when it is toward something which causes it, is called APPETITE, or DESIRE.

And when the Endeavour is fromward something, it is generally called AVERSION.

Desire: Absence of object / Love : Presence of the same.

Aversion: Absence of object / Hate : Presence of the same.

Of Appetites, and Aversions, some are born with men. But, not many. The rest, which are Appetites of particular things, proceed from Experience, and triall of their effects upon themselves, or other men.

For of things wee know not at all, or believe not to be, we can have no further Desire, than to tast and try. But Aversion wee have for things, not onely which we know have hurt us; but also that we do not know whether they will hurt us, or not.

Contempt - Those things which we neither Desire, nor Hate, we are said to Contemne: CONTEMPT being nothing els but an immobility, or contumacy of the Heart, in resisting the action of certain things; and proceeding from that the Heart is already moved otherwise, by either more potent objects; or from want of experience of them.

And because the constitution of a mans Body, is in continuall mutation; it is impossible that all the same things should alwayes cause in him the same Appetites, and aversions: much lesse can all men consent, in the Desire of almost any one and the same Object.

 

·    Good Evill - But whatsoever is the object of any mans Appetite or Desire; that is it, which he for his part calleth Good: And the object of his Hate, and Aversion, evill;

·    Contempt - And of his contempt, Vile, and Inconsiderable.

For these words of Good, evill, and Contemptible, are ever used with relation to the person that useth them: There being nothing simply and absolutely so; but from the Person of the man (where there is no Common-wealth;) or, (in a Common-wealth,) From the Person that representeth it; or from an Arbitrator or Judge, whom men disagreeing shall by consent set up, and make his sentence the Rule thereof.

·    Delight Displeasure - So, when the action of the same object is continued from the Eyes, Eares, and other organs to the Heart; the real effect there is nothing but Motion, or Endeavour; which consisteth in Appetite, or Aversion, to, or from the object moving. But the apparence, or sense of that motion, is that wee either call DELIGHT, or TROUBLE OF MIND.

Pleasure, (or Delight,) is the apparence, or sense of Good; and Molestation or Displeasure, the apparence, or sense of evill.

·    Joy and Grief - Pleasures Of Sense Pleasures Of The Mind Joy Paine Griefe Of Pleasures, or Delights, some arise from the sense of an object Present; And those may be called Pleasures Of Sense. Others arise from the Expectation, that proceeds from foresight of the End, or Consequence of things; whether those things in the Sense Please or Displease: And these are Pleasures Of The Mind of him that draweth those consequences; and are generally called JOY. In the like manner, Displeasures, are some in the Sense, and called PAYNE; others, in the Expectation of consequences, and are called GRIEFE.

·    These simple Passions called Appetite, Desire, Love, Aversion, Hate, Joy, and griefe, have their names for divers considerations diversified.

1)    Likelihood of attaining what they desire.

2)    The object loved or hated.

3)    The consideration of many of them together.

4)    The Alteration or succession it selfe.

Hope For Appetite with an opinion of attaining, is called HOPE.

Despaire - The same, without such opinion, DESPAIRE.

Feare - Aversion, with opinion of Hurt from the object, FEARE.

Courage - The same, with hope of avoyding that Hurt by resistance, COURAGE.

Anger - Sudden Courage, ANGER.

Confidence - Constant Hope, CONFIDENCE of our selves.

Diffidence - Constant Despayre, DIFFIDENCE of our selves.

Indignation - Anger for great hurt done to another, when we conceive the same to be done by Injury, INDIGNATION.

Benevolence - Desire of good to another, BENEVOLENCE, GOOD WILL, CHARITY. If to man generally, GOOD NATURE.

Covetousnesse - Desire of Riches, COVETOUSNESSE: a name used alwayes in signification of blame; because men contending for them, are displeased with one anothers attaining them; though the desire in it selfe, be to be blamed, or allowed, according to the means by which those Riches are sought.

Ambition - Desire of Office, or precedence, AMBITION: a name used also in the worse sense, for the reason before mentioned.

Pusillanimity - Desire of things that conduce but a little to our ends; And fear of things that are but of little hindrance, PUSILLANIMITY.

Magnanimity - Contempt of little helps, and hindrances, MAGNANIMITY.

Valour - Magnanimity, in danger of Death, or Wounds, VALOUR, FORTITUDE.

Liberality - Magnanimity in the use of Riches, LIBERALITY

Miserablenesse - Pusillanimity, in the same WRETCHEDNESSE, MISERABLENESSE; or PARSIMONY; as it is liked or disliked.

Kindnesse - Love of Persons for society, KINDNESSE.

Naturall Lust - Love of Persons for Pleasing the sense onely, NATURAL LUST.

Luxury - Love of the same, acquired from Rumination, that is Imagination of Pleasure past, LUXURY.

The Passion Of Love, Jealousie - Love of one singularly, with desire to be singularly beloved, THE PASSION OF LOVE. The same, with fear that the love is not mutuall, JEALOUSIE.

Revengefulnesse - Desire, by doing hurt to another, to make him condemn some fact of his own, REVENGEFULNESSE.

Curiosity - Desire, to know why, and how, CURIOSITY; such as is in no living creature but Man; so that Man is distinguished, not onely by his Reason; but also by this singular Passion from other Animals; in whom the appetite of food, and other pleasures of Sense, by praedominance, take away the care of knowing causes; which is a Lust of the mind, that by a perseverance of delight in the continuall and indefatigable generation of Knowledge, exceedeth the short vehemence of any carnall Pleasure.

Religion, Superstition, True Religion - Feare of power invisible, feigned by the mind, or imagined from tales publiquely allowed, RELIGION; not allowed, superstition. And when the power imagined is truly such as we imagine, TRUE RELIGION.

Panique Terrour - Feare, without the apprehension of why, or what, PANIQUE TERROR; called so from the fables that make Pan the author of them; whereas in truth there is always in him that so feareth, first, some apprehension of the cause, though the rest run away by example; every one supposing his fellow to know why. And therefore this Passion happens to none but in a throng, or multitude of people.

Admiration - Joy, from apprehension of novelty, ADMIRATION; proper to man, because it excites the appetite of knowing the cause.

Glory Vaine-glory Joy, arising from imagination of a man's own power and ability, is that exultation of the mind which is called GLORYING: which, if grounded upon the experience of his own former actions, is the same with Confidence: but if grounded on the flattery of others, or onely supposed by himselfe, for delight in the consequences of it, is called

VAINE-GLORY: which name is properly given; because a well-grounded Confidence begetteth attempt; whereas the supposing of power does not, and is therefore rightly called Vaine.

Dejection - Griefe, from opinion of want of power, is called dejection of mind.

Sudden Glory, Laughter - Sudden glory, is the passion which maketh those Grimaces called LAUGHTER; and is caused either by some sudden act of their own, that pleaseth them; or by the apprehension of some deformed thing in another, by comparison whereof they suddenly applaud themselves. And it is incident most to them, that are conscious of the fewest abilities in themselves; who are forced to keep themselves in their own favour, by observing the imperfections of other men. And therefore much Laughter at the defects of others is a signe of Pusillanimity. For of great minds, one of the proper workes is, to help and free others from scorn; and compare themselves onely with the most able.

Sudden Dejection, Weeping - On the contrary, Sudden Dejection is the passion that causeth WEEPING : and they are most subject to it, that rely principally on helps externall.

But in all cases, both Laughter and Weeping, are sudden motions; Custome taking them both away. For no man Laughs at old jests; or Weeps for an old calamity.

Shame - Griefe, for the discovery of some defect of ability is SHAME.  a signe of the love of good reputation

Impudence - The Contempt of good reputation is called IMPUDENCE.

Pitty - Griefe, for the calamity of another is PITTY.

Cruelty Contempt, or little sense of the calamity of others, is that which men call CRUELTY;

Emulation, Envy -  Griefe, for the success of a Competitor in wealth, honour, or other good, if it be joyned with Endeavour to enforce our own abilities to equal or exceed him, is called EMULATION: but joyned with Endeavour to supplant or hinder a Competitor, ENVIE.

 

Deliberation - the whole sum of Desires, Aversions, Hopes and Feares, continued till the thing be either done, or thought impossible, is that we call DELIBERATION

And it is called DELIBERATION; because it is a putting an end to the Liberty we had of doing, or omitting, according to our own Appetite, or Aversion.

Beasts also Deliberate.

will - The Will In Deliberation, the last Appetite, or Aversion, immediately adhaering to the action, or to the omission thereof, is that wee call the WILL; the Act, (not the faculty,) of Willing. And Beasts that have Deliberation must necessarily also have Will.

Inclination, which makes no Action Voluntary

 

·    Formes Of Speech by which the Passions are expressed
partly the same, and partly different from those, by which we express our Thoughts.

Forms of Speech, I say, are expressions, or voluntary significations of our Passions: but certain signes they be not; because they may be used arbitrarily, whether they that use them, have such Passions or not.

·    Good And Evill Apparent - And because in Deliberation the Appetites and Aversions are raised by foresight of the good and evill consequences, and sequels of the action whereof we Deliberate; the good or evill effect thereof dependeth on the foresight of a long chain of consequences, of which very seldome any man is able to see to the end. But for so far as a man seeth, if the Good in those consequences be greater than the evill, the whole chain is that which Writers call Apparent or Seeming Good. And contrarily, when the evill exceedeth the good, the whole is Apparent or Seeming Evill: so that he who hath by Experience, or Reason, the greatest and surest prospect of Consequences, Deliberates best himself; and is able, when he will, to give the best counsel unto others.

·    Felicity- Continual Successe in obtaining those things which a man from time to time desireth, that is to say, continual prospering, is that men call FELICITY; For there is no such thing as perpetual Tranquillity of mind, while we live here; because Life itself is but Motion, and can never be without Desire, nor without Feare, no more than without Sense.

        Chap 7. Of the Ends or Resolutions of Discourse

 

Of all Discourse, governed by desire of Knowledge, there is at last an End, either by attaining, or by giving over. And in the chain of Discourse, wheresoever it be interrupted, there is an End for that time.

Deliberation	Good or Evil	Desire	Deliberate	Will
Discourse	Enquiry of the truth of Past, and Future.	Opinion	Doubt	Judgement, Resoulte, Finall Sentence

 

wheresoever you break off the chayn of a mans Discourse, you leave him in a Praesumption of It Will Be, or, It Will Not Be; or it Has Been, or, Has Not Been. All which is Opinion.

No Discourse whatsoever, can End in absolute knowledge of Fact, past, or to come. For, as for the knowledge of Fact, it is originally, Sense; and ever after, Memory. And for the knowledge of consequence, which I have said before is called Science, it is not Absolute, but Conditionall. No man can know by Discourse, that this, or that, is, has been, or will be; which is to know absolutely: but onely, that if This be, That is; if This has been, That has been; if This shall be, That shall be: which is to know conditionally; and that not the consequence of one thing to another; but of one name of a thing, to another name of the same thing.

·    Science
And therefore, when the Discourse is put into Speech, and begins with the Definitions of Words, and proceeds by Connexion of the same into general Affirmations, and of these again into Syllogismes, the end or last sum is called the Conclusion; and the thought of the mind by it signified is that conditional Knowledge, or Knowledge of the consequence of words, which is commonly called Science.

·    Opinion
But if the first ground of such Discourse be not Definitions, or if the Definitions be not rightly joyned together into Syllogismes, then the End or Conclusion is again OPINION, namely of the truth of somewhat said, though sometimes in absurd and senslesse words, without possibility of being understood.

·    Conscience
pretend to know they are true, when they know at most but that they think so.

 

·    Beliefe, Faith
When a mans Discourse beginneth not at Definitions, it beginneth either at some other contemplation of his own, and then it is still called Opinion; Or it beginneth at some saying of another, of whose ability to know the truth, and of whose honesty in not deceiving, he doubteth not; and then the Discourse is not so much concerning the Thing, as the Person; And the Resolution is called BELEEFE, and FAITH: Faith, In the man; Beleefe, both Of the man, and Of the truth of what he sayes. So then in Beleefe are two opinions; one of the saying of the man; the other of his vertue. To Have Faith In, or Trust To, or Beleeve A Man, signifie the same thing; namely, an opinion of the veracity of the man: But to Beleeve What Is Said, signifieth onely an opinion of the truth of the saying.
But by Beleeving In, as it is in the Creed, is meant, not trust in the Person; but Confession and acknowledgement of the Doctrine.
And consequently, when wee Believe that the Scriptures are the word of God, having no immediate revelation from God himselfe, our Beleefe, Faith, and Trust is in the Church.

 

        Chap. 8. OF THE VERTUES COMMONLY CALLED INTELLECTUAL; AND THEIR CONTRARY DEFECTS.

vertues intellectuall
Vertue Defined Vertue generally, in all sorts of subjects, is somewhat that is valued for eminence; and consisteth in comparison. For if all things were equally in all men, nothing would be prized. And by Vertues INTELLECTUALL, are always understood such abilityes of the mind, as men praise, value, and desire should be in themselves; and go commonly under the name of a Good Witte. 

 

Wit, natural, acquired.

    Natural Wit
By Naturall, I mean not, that which a man hath from his Birth: for that is nothing else but Sense; wherein men differ so little one from another, and from brute Beasts, as it is not to be reckoned amongst Vertues. But I mean, that Witte, which is gotten by Use onely, and Experience; without Method, Culture, or Instruction

This NATURALL WITTE, consisteth principally in two things; Celerity Of Imagining, (that is, swift succession of one thought to another;) and Steddy Direction to some approved end.

·         Good Fancy
Like One Another, or in what they be Unlike, or What They Serve For, or How They Serve To Such A Purpose; Those that observe their similitudes. But without Steddinesse, and Direction to some End, a great Fancy is one kind of Madnesse.

·         Good Judgement, Discrition
observe their differences, and dissimilitudes; which is called Distinguishing, and Discerning, and Judging between thing and thing; in case, such discerning be not easie, are said to have a Good Judgement.

And in any Discourse whatsoever, if the defect of Discretion be apparent, how extravagant soever the Fancy be, the whole discourse will be taken for a signe of want of wit; and so will it never when the Discretion is manifest, though the Fancy be never so ordinary.

·         Prudence
When the thoughts of a man, that has a designe in hand, running over a multitude of things, observes how they conduce to that designe; or what designe they may conduce into; if his observations be such as are not easie, or usuall. dependeth on much Experience, and Memory.
Because the Experience of men equall in age, is not much unequall, as to the quantity; but lyes in different occasions; every one having his private designes. To govern well a family, and a kingdome, are not different degrees of Prudence.

·         Craft
if you adde the use of unjust, or dishonest means, such as usually are prompted to men by Feare, or Want; you have that Crooked Wisdome, which is called CRAFT; which is a signe of Pusillanimity. For Magnanimity is contempt of unjust, or dishonest helps.

 

    Acquired Wit
Reason; which is grounded on the right use of Speech; and produceth the Sciences.

 

The causes of this difference of Witts, are in the Passions: and the difference of Passions, proceedeth partly from the different Constitution of the body, and partly from different Education.

The Passions that most of all cause the differences of Wit, are principally, the more or lesse Desire of Power, of Riches, of Knowledge, and of Honour. All which may be reduced to the first, that is Desire of Power. For Riches, Knowledge and Honour are but severall sorts of Power.

 

 

A man who has no great Passion for any of these things; but is as men terme it indifferent; though he may be so farre a good man, as to be free from giving offence; yet he cannot possibly have either a great Fancy, or much Judgement.

 

 

·    giddinesse -  To have Passions indifferently for every thing, GIDDINESSE, and Distraction;

·    madnesse. - To have stronger, and more vehement Passions for any thing, than is ordinarily seen in others, is that which men call MADNESSE.

Whereof there be almost as many kinds, as of the Passions themselves.

Melancholy-  Dejection, subjects a man to causelesse fears; which is a Madnesse commonly called MELANCHOLY, apparent also in divers manners

The opinions of the world, both in antient and later ages, concerning the cause of madnesse, have been two. Some, deriving them from the Passions; some, from Daemons, or Spirits, either good, or bad, which they thought might enter into a man, possesse him, and move his organs is such strange, and uncouth manner, as mad-men use to do.

And as the Romans in this, held the same opinion with the Greeks(polytheosis): so also did the Jewes(monotheosis);

I can imagine no reason, but that which is common to all men; namely, the want of curiosity to search naturall causes; and their placing Felicity, in the acquisition of the grosse pleasures of the Senses, and the things that most immediately conduce thereto.

 

Insignificant Speech There is yet another fault in the Discourses of some men; which may also be numbred amongst the sorts of Madnesse; namely, that abuse of words.

 

         Chap 9. Of the severall Subjects of Knowledge.

There are of KNOWLEDGE two kinds; whereof one is Knowledge Of Fact: the other Knowledge Of The Consequence Of One Affirmation To Another. The former is nothing else, but Sense and Memory, and is Absolute Knowledge; as when we see a Fact doing, or remember it done: And this is the Knowledge required in a Witnesse. The later is called Science; and is Conditionall;

 

         Chap 10. Of Power, Worth, Dignity, Honour, an Worthinesse

 

·    Power - The POWER of a Man, (to take it Universally,) is his present means, to obtain some future apparent Good. And is either Originall(Natural), or Instrumentall.

The Greatest of humane Powers, is that which is compounded of the Powers of most men, united by consent, in one person, Naturall, or civill, that has the use of all their Powers depending on his will; such as is the Power of a Common-wealth: or depending on the wills of each particular; such as is the Power of a Faction, or of divers factions leagued. Therefore to have servants, is Power; To have Friends, is Power: for they are strengths united.

Also Riches joyned with liberality, is Power; because it procureth friends, and servants: Without liberality, not so; because in this case they defend not; but expose men to Envy, as a Prey.

Reputation of power, is Power; because it draweth with it the adhaerance of those that need protection. So is Reputation of love of a mans Country, (called Popularity,) for the same Reason.

Also, what quality soever maketh a man beloved, or feared of many; or the reputation of such quality, is Power; because it is a means to have the assistance, and service of many.

Good successe is Power; because it maketh reputation of Wisdome, or good fortune; which makes men either feare him, or rely on him.

Affability of men alreadyin power, is encrease of Power; because it gaineth love.

Reputation of Prudence in the conduct of Peace or War, is Power; because to prudent men, we commit the government of our selves, more willingly than to others.

Nobility is Power, not in all places, but onely in those Common-wealths, where it has Priviledges: for in such priviledges consisteth their Power.

Eloquence is Power; because it is seeming Prudence.

Forme is Power; because being a promise of Good, it recommendeth men to the favour of women and strangers.

The Sciences, are small Power; because not eminent; and therefore, not acknowledged in any man; nor are at all, but in a few; and in them, but of a few things. For Science is of that nature, as none can understand it to be, but such as in a good measure have attayned it.

Arts of publique use, as Fortification, making of Engines, and other Instruments of War; because they conferre to Defence, and Victory, are Power; And though the true Mother of them, be Science, namely the Mathematiques; yet, because they are brought into the Light, by the hand of the Artificer, they be esteemed (the Midwife passing with the vulgar for the Mother,) as his is

sue.

· 

   Worth The Value, or WORTH of a man, is as of all other things, his Price;
Givenfor the use of his Power: and therefore is not absolute; but a thing dependant on the need and judgement of another.
The manifestation of the Value we set on one another, is that which is commonly called Honouring, and Dishonouring. To Value a man at a high rate, is to Honour him; at a low rate, is to Dishonour him. But high, and low, in this case, is to be understood by comparison to the rate that each man setteth on himselfe.

·    Dignity
The publique worth of a man, which is the Value set on him by the Common-wealth, is that which men commonly call DIG

NITY.

·    To

Honour and Dishonour

To pray to another, for ayde of any kind, is to HONOUR; because a signe we have an opinion he has power to help; and the more difficult the ayde is, the more is the Honour.

To obey, is to Honour; because no man obeyes them, whom they think have no power to help, or hurt them. And consequently to disobey, is to Dishonour.

To give great gifts to a man, is to Honour him; because 'tis buying of Protection, and acknowledging of Power. To give little gifts, is to Dishonour; because it is but Almes, and signifies an opinion of the need of small helps.

To be sedulous in promoting anothers good; also to flatter, is to Honour; as a signe we seek his protection or ayde. To neglect, is to Dishonour.

To give way, orpla ce to another, in anCommodiy ty, is to Honour; being a confession of greater power. To arrogate, is to Dishonour.

To shew any signe of love, or feare of another, is to Honour; for both to love, and to feare, is to value. To contemne, or lesse to love or feare then he expects, is to Dishonour; for 'tis undervaluing.

To praise, magnifiec, or all happy, is to Honour; because nothing but goodnesse, power, and felicity is valued. To revile, mock, or pitty, is to Dishon

our.

To s

peak to another with consideration, to appear before him with decency, and humility, is to Honour him; as signes of fear to offend. To speak to him rashly, to do anything before him obscenely, slovenly, impudently, is to Dishonour.

To believe, to trust, to rely on another, is to Honour him; signe of opinion of his vertue and power. To distrust, or not believe, is to Dishonour.

To hearken to a mans counsell, or discourse of what kind soever, is to Honour; as a signe we think him wise, or eloquent, or witty. To sleep, or go forth, or talk the while, is to Dishonour.

To do those things to another, which he takes for signes of Honour, or which the Law or Custome makes so, is to Honour; because in approving the Honour done by others, he acknowledgeth the power which others acknowledge. To refuse to do them, is to Dishonour.

To agree with in opinion, is to Honour; as being a signe of approving his judgement, and wisdome. To dissent, is Dishonour; and an upbraiding of errour; and (if the dissent be in many things) of folly.

To imitate, is to Honour; for it is vehemently to approve. To imitate ones Enemy, is to Dishonour.

To honour those another honours, is to Honour him; as a signe of approbation of his judgement. To honour his Enemies, is to Dishonour him.

To employ in counsell, or in actions of difficulty, is to Honour; as a signe of opinion of his wisdome, or other power. To deny employment in the same cases, to those that seek it, is to Dishonour.

Honourable is whatsoever possession, action, or quality, is an argument and signe of Power.

Having so many signes of favour in the Common-wealth; which favouPr is ower

.

And t

herefore To be Honoured, loved, or feared of many, is Honourable; as arguments of Power. To be Honoured of few or none, Dishonourable.

Good fortune (if lasting,) Honourable; as a signe of the favour of God. Ill fortune, and losses, Dishonourable. Riches, are Honourable; for they are Power. Poverty, Dishonourable. Magnanimity, Liberality, Hope, Courage, Confidence, are Honourable; for they proceed from the conscience of Power. Pusillanimity, Parsimony, Fear, Diffidence, are Dishonourable.

Timely Resolution, or determination of what a man is to do, is Honourable; as being the contempt of small difficulties, and dangers. And Irresolution, Dishonourable; as a signe of too much valuing of little impediments, and little advantages: For when a man has weighed things as long as the time permits, and resolves not, the difference of weight is but little; and therefore if he resolve not, he overvalues little things, which is Pusillanimity.

All Actions, and Speeches, that proceed, or seem to proceed from much Experience, Science, Discretion, or Wit, are Honourable; For all these are Powers. Actions, or Words that proceed from Errour, Ignorance, or Folly, Dishonourable.

Gravity, as farre forth as it seems to proceed from a mind employed on some thing else, is Honourable; because employment is a signe of Power. But if it seem to proceed from a purpose to appear grave, it is Dishonourable. For the gravity of the Former, is like the steddinesse of a Ship laden with Merchandise; but of the later, like the steddinesse of a Ship ballasted with Sand, and oth

er trash.

T

o be Conspicuous, that is to say, to be known, for Wealth, Office, great Actions, or any eminent Good, is Honourable; as a signe of the power for which he is conspicuous. On the contrary, Obscurity, is Dishonourable.

·    Actions proceeding from Equity, joyned with losse, are Honourable; as signes of Magnanimity: for Magnanimity is a signe of Power. On the contrary, Craft, Shifting, neglect of Equity, is Dishonourable.

Nor does it alter the case of Honour, whether an action (so it be great and difficult, and consequently a signe of much power,) be just or unjust: for Honour consisteth onely in the opinion of Power.

·    Worthinesse Fitnesse
WORTHINESSE, is a thing different from the worth, or value of a man; and also from his merit, or desert; and consisteth in a particular power, or ability for that, whereof he is said to be worthy: which particular ability, is usually named FITNESSE, or Aptitude.